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INFANTS' LIABILITY-WHEN NOT LIABLE
Infants, whether they be called by that name or some
similar one such as juveniles, children, or minors, have al-
ways been a problem in the field of social science. The
difficulty of formulating and enforcing proper rules of con-
duct within the social arena has its counterpart in the vast
field of doubt, confusion, and contradiction in the interpreta-
tion of simple rules and standards applicable to infants' con-
tracts, especially when tortious conduct is connected there-
with. There is one advantage in the legal as contra to the
social problem involved and that is that infancy ceases in
law at the age of majority, while in its social aspects of
state and parental care there is no set or definite age of
discretion. However, even here different states have dif-
ferent ages of majority. Infancy usually ceases by law at
age twenty-one, although in the case of females, eighteen is
very frequently prescribed and for some purposes such as
marriage nearly always is.
It is my purpose herein to state a hypothetical case of not
uncommon occurrence, a few simple accepted rules applica-
ble thereto, and then note the different conclusions reached
in the application of the rules stated. It is not claimed
that other rules and laws than the ones mentioned have no
bearing on the decisions, but in all cases covered some of
the rules that I shall set out must be interpreted along with
the others.
Hypothetical Case. A, an adult (a corporation or pri-
vate individual) sells a truck to I, an infant, for the regular
and reasonable selling price of $2000.00. I is twenty years
of age, is engaged in the hauling business, and wants the
truck for that purpose. He appears to be of age and is
known by A to be in the business of hauling for hire. I
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represents that he is twenty-one years old which A rea-
sonably and readily believes. I pays $800.00 down and
signs a conditional bill of sale agreeing to pay the balance
in installments of $100.00 a month. He signs a note rep-
resenting this balance which calls for reasonable attorney's
fees in case of default. I uses the truck for six months,
pays in $600.00 on the contract, and earns $500.00 from
the use of the truck in addition to his labor. At the end
of six months I, due to negligent driving, smashes into a
telephone pole and demplishes the truck so that it is now
worth about $400.00. I takes the truck back to A, dis-
affirms his contract, and demands his money back with in-
terest thereon. A, on the other hand, insists that I com-
plete his payments, takes the truck according to the con-
tract, and applies its value, $400.00, on the purchase price
leaving a balance of $200.00 yet unpaid.
RuLES
Rule One. An infant is not liable on his contracts ex-
cept where the law creates a responsibility such as for the
reasonable value of necessaries, the support of his wife, etc.
Rule Two. An infant is liable for his torts excepting
those arising out of contract.
Rule Three. An infant can disaffirm his purchase or sale
of personal property I either before majority or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
Rule Four. An infant, on disaffirming his contract, must
restore the property he has received under the contract if
it is still under his control.
1 It is not intended that any inference should be drawn to the effect that
infants' contracts relating to realty cannot be repudiated. Except for the fact
that an infant's contract covering real property may only be disaffirmed after
majority, and some few other differences, the discussion herein is as applicable
to real property as it is to personal property.
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RESULTS
If A sues I in an action on the contract for the balance
due and I counterclaims for the money he has paid in, the
following results will be obtained, depending on the juris-
diction where the action arises:
Result One. A recovers nothing; I recovers the entire
$1400.00 paid in with interest.
Result Two. A recovers nothing; I recovers nothing.
Result Three. I recovers $900.00.
Result Four. A recovers on the contract, that is, the
balance of $200.00 plus reasonable attorney's fees as set
out in the note; I recovers nothing.
If I brings a bill in equity to recover his payments we ob-
tain the same results as above, but not necessarily in the
same jurisdictions.
If A sues I in an action at law in deceit for damages
caused by the misrepresentation of age, which may or may
not be allowed depending on the jurisdiction, the amount
of recovery, where permitted, is the actual damage caused
by the deceit which in some cases, including the "hypothe-
tical case," will be a different sum from any listed in "Re-
sults" One, Two, Three, or Four, because the loss occas-
ioned by the non-fulfillment of the contract is not necessarily
the actual damage caused by the deceit. The contract loss
may include reasonable attorney's fees on the notes given,
and it may call for a higher rate of interest than that allowed
by law on money damages.
In dealing with the problems involved in the "hypothet-
ical case," I shall occasionally assume added facts, or delete
som- existing ones in order to show how such changes will
add further differences in the decisions in some jurisdictions,
whereas in others the same change of facts would have no
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legal effect. For example, I shall consider the "hypothetical
case" with and without the misrepresentation of age, the
truck as a passenger car for pleasure, the damage as wil-
ful as well as negligent, or as accidental, etc.
CONTRACT ACTION
There are three deductions made by different states in
applying the rule that an infant can disaffirm his contract
for the purchase or sale of personal property by restoring
the property he has received under the contract if it is still
under his control, that is, there are three rules of liability
or responsibility where an infant is not liable on his con-
tract.2 These three deductions are made where there is no
misrepresentation of age, but except for a very few states
the misrepresentation of age does not affect the result ob-
tained by these deductions where the action is one at law
on the contract. The three rules (deductions) follow.
The Massachusetts or majority rule is that an infant on
disaffirming his purchase of personal property and offering
to return that part of the property, if any, which he still
has in his control may recover what he has paid therefor
without deduction for its use or depreciation. Under this
rule in the "hypothetical case" we would have Result One,
that is, A would be entitled to nothing, but I, the infant, can
recover all he has paid in on the truck without any deduction
for its damage, use, or depreciation in value. The infant
has paid in $1400.00, hence he will get judgment for
$1400.00 plus proper interest.
The Massachusetts rule is followed in Arkansas,3 Illinois,4
2 See rule four following the "hypothetical case."
3 Arkansas Reo Motor Company v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S. W. 975
(1924) (A pleasure car and a misrepresentation of age.)
4 Hauser v. Marmon Chicago Company, 208 Ill. App. 171 (1917) (No
misrepresentation) ; Wuller v. Chuse Grocery Store, 241 Ill. 398, 89 N. E. 796
(1909) (Stock purchase. A business deal. Emancipated. No misrepresentation
of age.)
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Indiana,' Maine,6 Massachusetts,7 Michigan,' North Caro-
lina,' Rhode Island,' ° Texas,'1 Utah,"- and Vermont.' 3
The reasoning for the decisions under the majority rule
is simply that a minor may disaffirm his contracts except
those for necessaries and since an article purchased for busi-
ness purposes is not a necessary under any circumstance, he
is not bound on the contract. All courts would so agree.
Then since a truck is not a necessary, even though the minor
earns his living by the use of it, and has no other means of
support, the minor is no more liable for its use and deprecia-
tion than he would be for its agreed price. Its use or its
depreciation is no more a necessary than is the article it-
self. If the minor had made no advance on the purchase
price, the adult could recover nothing, and could not main-
tain an action for its use or depreciation. A contract to
pay for such use or its depreciation, or damage is one the
minor would be incapable of making to bind himself be-
cause his infancy, if pleaded, would be a bar to the suit.
Then, if that is so, the adult cannot avail himself of and
enforce a claim by way of recoupment which he could not
enforce by a direct suit. In other words, if the adult sues
5 Story & Clark Piano Company v. Davy, 119 N. E. 177 (Ind. App. 1918)
(Piano. No misrepresentation of age.)
6 Utterstrom v. Kidder, 124 Me. 10, 124 AtI. 725 (1924) (Truck for business.
No misrepresentation of age.)
7 Gillis v. Goodwin, 180 Mass. 140, 61 N. E. 813 (1901) (Bicycle. No mis-
representation) ; Simpson v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 184 Mass. 348, 68
N. E. 673 (1903). Cf.: Chicago Mutual Life Ind. Association v. Hunt, 127 Ill.
257, 20 N. E. 55, 2 L. R. A. 549 (1889) (Life insurance.)
8 Reynolds v. Garber Buick Company, 183 Mich. 157, 149 N. W. 985 (1914)
(Pleasure car. No misrepresentation of age.)
9 Greensboro Morris Plan Company v. Palmer, 185 N. C. 109, 116 S. E.
261 (1923) (Truck for.business. Earnings therefrom. Misrepresentation of age.
Deceit action.)
1o McGuckian v. Carpenter, 43 R. I. 94, 110 AtI. 402, 16 A. L. R. 1473
(1920) (Horse, harness, and wagon. Minor married.)
11 Mast v. Strahan, 225 S. W. 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (Horse. No mis-
representation of age. Emancipated.)
12 Blake v. Harding, 54 Utah 158, 180 Pac. 172 (1919) (Exchange of pony
and buggy for stock.)
13 Whitcomb v. Joslyn, 51 Vt. 79, 31 A. R. 678 (1878) (Wagon.)
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for the use, depreciation, or damage on a contract, he can-
not recover, then why permit a recovery indirectly by al-
lowing a set-off of the depreciation when the infant is suing
the adult to get his money back. The contract when avoided
by a minor is void ab initio.
The majority further reason that the law gives to a minor
the right to disaffirm his contracts on the ground of the
disability of his infancy, that is, to provide a protection
for him from the consequences of his own improvidence
and foolishness. If it is lack of foresight that leads to the
contract, then it is the same lack of judgment that causes
him to dissipate the proceeds of his contract. To hold
otherwise than that he may not only disaffirm his voidable
contracts without placing the adult in status quo and also
that he need not account for depreciation or use, would be
holding the infant to a sound discretion in the use of an
article which he did not have a sufficient discretion to ob-
tain in the first place. It is from the results of the infant's
improvidence that the law seeks to protect him and not
against the contract itself, for the minor may always hold
the adult to his contract if he desires. Hence depreciation
and damage, the results of the infant's contract, are the
main items from which he is protected because of his in-
discretion.
It is also reasoned that though the rule may be harsh in
its application to a particular case, still in its general appli-
cation, for which of course the law is made, it does not
work out harshly and always gives the full protection de-
sired. Any overreaching by the adult would not only be
without profit, but would be positively unprofitable.
An illustration of this rule is Reynolds v. Garber Buick
Company,14 where the plaintiff, a minor twenty years of
age, bought a Ford automobile from the defendant company,
14 183 Mich. 157, 149 N. W. 985 (1914).
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paying $300.00 for it. Later he exchanged the Ford with
the defendant for a Buick and paid $75.00 extra. The
plaintiff became twenty-one years of age and shortly there-
after he asserted, says the court, his newly acquired man-
hood by disaffirming these contracts, returning the Buick
and demanding that the money he paid in be refunded. In
this case there was no misrepresentation of age. The plain-
tiff minor recovered the $375.00 with interest without any
deduction for use or depreciation. 5
In Arkansas Reo Motor Company v. Goodlett,16 Ora
Goodlett, a girl slightly under eighteen, purchased a car
from the motor company for $650.00, paying $425.00 in
all. She ran it for three months and turned it back in a
badly damaged condition. The gears were stripped, the
motor was burned out from failure to keep oil in it, the
tires worn out and replaced with cheap ones, and so gen-
erally wrecked that it would cost $800.00 in replacements
to make it worth $500.00 to sell as a used car. It was
worth between $10.00 and $25.00 as junk. She had mis-
represented her age. Shortly after coming of age (eighteen)
she sued to rescind the contract and to recover the $425.00
paid in. She recovered. The court said:
"It is said to be a harsh rule that permits an infant to purchase
property, paying the price therefor, and, after consuming it, wasting
it, or carelessly or wilfully 17 destroying it, sue the seller and recover
the price paid; but the rule, even in instances where it is harsh in its
application, is justified as the only means whereby an infant may be
protected from improvident contracts."
In Greensboro Morris Plan Company v. Palmer,' Palmer,
nineteen years of age, having the appearance of a man of
1 In this case the defendant and plaintiff both received the consent of the
plaintiff's guardian for the transaction. The court said this might make the
guardian liable, but not the minor.
16 116 Ark. 35, 258 S. W. 975 (1924).
17 The word "wilfully" goes too far even under the majority rule. The
infdnt would be liable for wilful destruction or injury.
!R 185 N. C. 109, 116 S. E. 261 (1923).
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full age, bought a truck from a motor company for over
$3000.00. He was emancipated, married, 9 and engaged
in the business of hauling lumber. He represented that he was
over twenty-one. He paid in over $2000.00 on the truck,
of which $1000.00 was from earnings from the truck. The
truck, when seized by the Morris Plan Company, the as-
signee of the motor company's claim, was worth $700.00.
The minor, Palmer, was allowed to recover the full amount
paid in without accounting to the seller for the use of the
truck while retained.2
The Massachusetts rule, though at times harsh, is per-
haps the most logical one if we assume that the law means
what it states, that is, that twenty-one, or whatever age is
set, is the age of discretion or majority. It is a fact that
lack of discretion is not present in some of the cases.
The. New York or minority rule is that an infant may
rescind his contract for the purchase of personal property
and on offering the return of the property purchased still
in his control can recover the money paid in on the con-
tract, but must allow for depreciation and use. However,
in no case can the adult recover more than the amount
he has already received on the contract regardless of the
extent of the depreciation.
Under this rule in the "hypothetical case" we would ob-
tain Result Two, that is, A recovers nothing; I recovers
nothing. Since the infant has paid in $1400.00 and the
depreciation is $1600.00 ($2000.00 original value less
$400.00 present value) the infant can recover nothing.
Neither can the adult recover anything more even though
the depreciation is $200.00 more than the payments re-
ceived. However, if we change the facts so that the de-
19 Marriage in some states by statutes makes the minor of the age of majority.
CODE OF IOWA (1931) c. 472, § 10492; Comrp. LAWS OF UTAH (1917) Title 67,
§ 3955; REV. STAT. OF KAq. (1923) C. 38, § 101.
20 The facts in this case are nearly identical to those in the "hypothetical
case."
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preciation is $600.00 and the amount paid in is still
$1400.00, then the infant could recover the difference or
$800.00.
The New York rule is followed in Alabama,"' Connecti-
cut,22 Canada, 3 District of Columbia, 24 England, 25 Federal
Courts, 26 New York,27 Ohio,28 and Oregon..
2
1
The reasoning back of the minority view is that if the
contract of a minor is in fact a fair and reasonable one
with no overreaching of any kind on the part of the adult
and the minor has taken and used the article, then he should
not be allowed to recover the amount actually paid in with-
out allowing the adult seller the depreciation of the goods
while in his hands because (1) this fully and fairly protects
the infant against injustice and at the same time is fair to
business men who have dealt with the minor in good faith,
(2) it better fits our modern business conditions where in-
fants are permitted to transact a great deal of business for
themselves, (3) the moral influence is bad for their busi-
ness future for it discourages rather than encourages honesty
and integrity in dealing when a minor for his own benefit
21 McCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. McCluney, 219 Ala. 211, 121 So. 713
(1929) (Automobile. Misrepresentation of age.)
22 Creer v. Active Auto Exchange, 99 Conn. 266, 121 Atl. 888 (1923) (Mis-
representation of age); Shutter v. Fudge, 108 Conn. 528, 143 Atl. 896 (1928)
(Radio parts for business.)
23 Sturgeon v. Starr, 17 Western L. R. 402 (1911) (No recovery of amount
paid on rent and fixtures.)
24 Rice Auto Co. v. Spillman, 280 Fed. 452 (1921) (Car for business and
a misrepresentation of age.)
25 Valentini v. Canali, L. R. 24 Q. B. D. 166, 59 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 74, 61
L. T. N. S. 731 (1889) (Rented house and used the furniture. No recovery of
part paid.)
26 Myers v. Hurley Motor Car Co., 273 U. S. 18, 47 S. Ct. 277, 71 L. Ed.
515, 50 A. L. R. 118 (1927) (Misrepresentation of age.)
27 Sparandera v. Staten Island Garage, 117 Misc. Rep. 780, 193 N. Y. S.
392 (1921) (Automobile. Misrepresentation of age); Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y.
578, 55 N. E. 275, 47 L. R. A. 303, 73 A. S. R. 703 (1899) (Bicycle.)
28 Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Oh. St. 575, 165 N. E. 93 (1929)
(Automobile. Misrepresentation of age.)
29 Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660, 11 A. L. R. 487 (1920)
(Automobile. No misrepresentation.)
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can buy and use an article, wear it out, and then compel the
return of his money. Trickery and dishonest, should not
be encouraged, (4) the law permitting an infant to disaf-
firm his contracts was meant as a shield and not as a sword.
If there has been any fraud or imposition on the part of the
adult, or advantage taken in inducing the contract, then the
minor is not to be held accountable.
The courts following this rule generally use the words de-
preciation and use. What is usually allowed is deprecia-
tion. Likely the courts are using the two terms synony-
mously. However, the depreciation of an article might be
small with considerable use, or large with no use at all. A
Connecticut court 11 refused to allow use and limited the
minor's responsibility to depreciation. The argument given
is similar to that under the majority rule, that is, to hold
for use would be holding on the contract, and if the article
is not a necessary, the use is not necessary.
A New York court 31 held the minor for depreciation and
use, or really for the reasonable value of the use of a car
for a period of five months, although used but four or five
times with no benefit received, and for all it appears the
depreciation may have been trivial.
It seems that if this rule were to be followed the proper
holding would be that the infant is responsible to the ex-
tent of his payments for depreciation in value, that is, the
difference in value between the time of the contract and
the time of disaffirmance. The courts in following this rule
after all are not aiming to hold on any contract basis, or use,
or usefulness to the infant, but to hold him to the amount
of the damage caused to the merchant who acted in good
faith, and limiting that liability to that which the infant has
already parted with. Neither are they for that matter
30 Creer v. Active Auto Exchange, op. cit. supra note 22.
31 Sparandera v. Staten Island Garage Co., op. cit. supra note 27; Wanisch
v. Wuertz, 79 Misc. Rep. 610, 140 N. Y. S. 573 (1913).
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holding for depreciation, obsolescence, or wear, but simply
that of changed value while in the hands of the infant.
A leading case supporting the New York rule is Pettit v.
Liston 32 where the plaintiff, a minor, bought a motorcycle
from the defendant company for $325.00, paying $125.00
down. He used the machine a little more than a month,
returned it to the company and demanded his money back.
The damage to the machine was $156.65, as admitted by
the demurrer, and since that was more than the minor had
paid in, he was denied any recovery.
Justice Bennett in deciding the case gave a very strong
argument for the New York rule, but refused to recognize
it as the minority. He cites many cases to support his
view, but some of them do not support his contention. The
Illinois case of Chicago Mutual Life Ind. Ass'n v. Hunt,33
which he cites, does not strictly support the New York rule
and in so far as it does, it was expressly overruled in Wuller
v. Chuse Grocery Store. 4
Minnesota and New Hampshire cases are also cited in
accord, but in fact the two states have a rule of their own
which will be discussed later under the third or provident
rule. Under the facts in the Oregon case, neither Minne-
sota nor New Hampshire would allow anything for depre-
ciation, but would permit the infant to recover the entire
$125.00 paid in.
In Shutter v. Fudge " the defendant, a minor seventeen
years of age, purchased merchandise which he manufactured
into radio sets and sold. The agreed reasonable market
value of the merchandise purchased was $415.87 and the
unpaid balance $213.00. The minor sold the sets and re-
ceived the benefits. The plaintiff adult sued, but no fur-
32 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660, 11 A. L. R. 487 (1920).
33 127 Il1. 257, 277, 20 N. E. 55, 2 L. R. A. 549 (1889).
34 Op. cit. supra note 4.
35 108 Conn. 528, 143 At. 896 (1928).
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ther recovery was allowed because where an infant has lost,
wasted, or disposed of the property received, he may never-
theless repudiate the contract without making restitution
in order to give effect to his disaffirmance. It might be
noted here that under the majority rule, the minor could
have recovered the $213.00 paid in.
This rule in many cases more nearly approaches justice
for the adult who has acted in good faith, but it seems that
it should be limited to depreciation caused by wear and tear
in the use of the article obtained and should not cover dam-
age caused by the minor's indiscretion. The very purpose
of allowing minors the power of disaffirmance is to protect
them against injury from lack of capacity. There are times
when the damage caused to the article is due to the minor's
lack of sound judgment, though the contract was fair and
reasonable.
The third or provident rule is that the contract of an in-
fant, though a fair, reasonable, and provident one, may be
rescinded, but the infant is entitled to recover only the
amount of his payments over and above the actual benefits
received from the contract. Benefit is used in the narrow
sense of actual gain from the contract.
Under this rule in the "hypothetical case" we would ob-
tain Result Three, that is, the infant would recover $900.00.
The amount paid in was $1400.00, the earning or gain from
the use of the truck was $500.00 and subtracting his lia-
bility, or the benefits, he has a net balance of $900.00 due
him.
If the property purchased had been a pleasure car, or
even a truck from which no earning or benefit accrued, the
infant on rescinding and returning the article purchased in
whatever condition of depreciation would recover the en-
tire arhount paid in, as he would under the majority rule.
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This rule is followed in Minnesota 6 and New Hamp-
shire," but it is not often recognized as a rule. Hence,
cases from these jurisdictions have been cited to support
both the Massachusetts and New York rules. It is more
closely akin to the Massachusetts or majority rule, since
it permits recovery without accounting for depreciation and
only rarely is there a benefit to deduct except mainly where
the article is to be used in business, and not always then.
This rule has also been referred to as placing business con-
tracts of an infant in the category of necessaries for which
an infant is liable. This, however, is not exactly accurate
because the infant does in all cases have the power to dis-
affirm which he does not have in executed contracts for
necessaries. Furthermore, the rule in theory applies to all
contracts for non-necessaries where actual benefits are re-
ceived, not merely business contracts.
An illustration of this rule is Berglund v. American Multi-
graph Sales Company,38 where the plaintiff, a minor nineteen
years of age, bought a multigraph machine from the defend-
ant for $475.00 on the payment plan, agreeing that the
amount paid in would cover the value of the use in case of
default. He kept the machine from April till July, his busi-
ness became unprofitable, and the machine was taken by
the defendant. The minor sought to recover the $160.60
paid in and was allowed $62.00 by the jury. The upper
court stated that the minor was obliged to account for the
benefits received from the use of the goods, but that the
benefits would not necessarily be the market value of such
use, or the rental value, or contract value, but the value of
36 Berglund v. American Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N. W.
191, (1916); Klaus v. A. C. Thomson Auto & Buggy Co., 131 Minn. 10, 154
N. W. 508 (1915).
37 Lavoie v. Woolridge, 79 N. H. 21, 104 AtI. 346 (1918); Stack v. Cava-
naugh, 67 N. H. 149, 30 Atl. 350 (1891).
38 Op. cit. supra note 36.
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the benefit to the minor. The court deemed $30.00 a suffi-
cient deduction and gave the minor $130.60 plus interest.
In Klaus v. A. C. Thomson Auto & Buggy Company39
the plaintiff, a grocery clerk twenty years of age, bought
an automobile for $1000.00, paid $200.00 cash and gave
a note for $800.00 covering the balance. He used the car
a few days, damaged it to the extent of $500.00 because of
his negligence, returned the car, and demanded his note and
money back. Full recovery was allowed. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota conceded that the contract was fair and
without overreaching, but held it not sane, reasonable, or
provident for a minor in plaintiff's circumstances to con-
tract for a pleasure car. Chief Justice Gilfillan's dissent in
the Minnesota case of Johnson v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co." was quoted on the meaning of "reasonable" and
"fair" as used in these decisions as follows:
"'If from the subject-matter or terms of the contract, it is a wasting
of his estate, so that to require him to restore what he has received
will likewise waste his estate, it will not be required of him. But if
the contract be, both in subject-matter and terms, a provident one,-
advantageous to the minor,--the court, to prevent a fraud on the
other party, unnecessary to his protection, will not permit him to
recover what he has parted with without setting off against it what
he has received.'"
Result Four to the effect that A, the adult, can recover
$200.00, the balance. due on the contract plus reasonable
attorney's fees according to the terms of the note, is ob-
tained in those states, though few in number, which estop
an infant in law from using his infancy as a defense or for
disaffirmance, if by fraud and misrepresentation he has in-
duced the adult to contract with him. Under this rule if
the infant who has misrepresented his age were to be sued
in an action at law based on the contract, he would be liable
thereon according to its terms.
39 Op. cit. supra note 36.
40 59 N. W. 992, 995 (Minn. 1894).
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It must be remembered that this rule of estoppel does not
apply unless there is fraud such as a misrepresentation of
age, which in fact induces the contract. If there is no such
inducing misrepresentation by word or conduct, then the
states following this rule decide under one of the three pre-
viously named rules, that is, the New York, Massachusetts,
or provident rule.
Some of the states following this rule are Georgia,4' Neb-
raska,4 2 New Jersey,43 and Texas.44  This is also the rule
in Kansas,45 Iowa,46 Utah, and Washington 4' by statute.
These statutes provide that no contract can be disaffirmed
where, on account of the minor's own misrepresentation as
to his majority, or from his having engaged in business as
an adult, the other party had good reasons to believe the
minor capable of contracting.49
An illustration of the rule of estoppel is Klinck v Reeder,5 °
where an infant, nineteen years of age, married,"' emanci-
pated, and having the appearance of a man, bought A tractor
from the plaintiff and gave his notes therefor. The infant
was engaged in business and stated that he was of age. In
an action against the minor on the notes, the plaintiff was
allowed recovery. The court reasoned that though gen-
erally the doctrine of estoppel in pais is not applicable to
infants, yet where the infant, mature of appearance and
transacting business for himself, falsely represents his age
41 Hood v. Duren, 33 Ga. App. 203, 125 S. E. 787 (1924); Watters v. Ar-
rington, 37 Ga. App. 461, 146 S. E. 773 (1929).
42 Klinck v. Reeder, 107 Neb. 342, 185 N. W. 1000 (1921).
43 La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N. J. L. 375, 105 Atl. 201, 6 A. L. R. 412 (1918).
44 Harsein v. Cohen, 25 S. W. 97 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); First State Bank
v. Edwards, 245 S. W. 478 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
45 REv. STAT. OF KAN. (1923) c. 38, § 103.
46 CODE OF IOWA (1931) c. 472, § 10494.
47 Co ps. LAWS Or UTAH (1917) Title 67, § 3957.
48 REmncGTON'S COMP. STAT. OF WASH. (1922) Vol. II., Title 37, § 5830.
49 See also Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. (6 Smith) 192, 17 S. W. (2d) 8 (1929);
Pinnacle Motor Co. v. Daugherty, 231 Ky. 626, 21 S. W. (2d) 1001 (1929).
50 Op. cit. supra note 42.
51 See note 19, op. cit. supra.
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to enter a contract with a person who believes such state-
ments to be true and relies thereon, thus parting with his
property, the benefit of which the infant receives and re-
tains, the doctrine of estoppel will apply.
In La Rosa v. Nichols 12 the plaintiff, a minor twenty
years of age, stored his car with the defendant who did some
work on it. The bill was $74.49 and defendant held the
car for payment. The minor brought replevin, but was
held estopped to assert his infancy because of a misrepre-
sentation of age. The court said that the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel, although the creature of equity, and depend-
ing upon equitable principles, is recognized and enforced
alike by courts of law and equity.
A few states " have statutes which provide that the con-
tract of a minor may be disaffirmed, but if he be over
eighteen years of age when contracting he must restore the
consideration to the party from whom it was received or
must pay its equivalent with interest. This rule requires
the minor to put the adult in status quo as a condition of
disaffirmance. It differs from the New York or minority
rule in that the infant not only has to pay for depreciation
and damage to the extent of payments already made, but
to the full extent of the loss regardless of the amount paid in.
IN EQUITY
It is laid down as a general rule that the doctrine of estop-
pel in pais does not apply to a minor, and therefore his mis-
-representation of age, or other deceit, does hot estop him
in equity any more than it does at law. Despite this rule,
decisions may be found in the majority of the states " where
52 Op. cit. supra note 43.
53 Comp. LAWS OF N. D. (1913) § 4340; CIV. CODE OF CAL. (1931) § 35;
IDAHO COUP. STAT. (1919) c. 181, § 4585; Murdock v. Fisher Finance Co., 79
Cal. App. 787, 251 Pac. 319 (1926).
54 Lewis v. Van Cleve, 302 Ill. 413, 134 N. E. 804 (1922); Adkins v. Adkins,
183 Ky. 662, 210 S. W. 462 (1919); International Land Co. v. Marshall, 22 Okla.
693, 98 Pac. 951, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1056 (1908); Tuck v. Payne, op. cit. supra
note 49; Stallard v. Sutherland, 131 Va. 316, 108 S. E. 568, 18 A. L. R. 516 (1921).
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the courts have refused an infant equitable relief in the re-
covery of property he has transferred where he has been
guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. The decisions are
based on grounds of equitable estoppel, or at least, the
courts so say.
The decisions mentioned have caused comments to the
effect that estoppel of infants does not apply at law, yet in
equity the courts are about evenly divided with probably
a majority allowing estoppel.
Naturally those states heretofore mentioned which estop
a minor for deceit at law and hold him to his contract will
do so in equity. However, even in equity, the overwhelming
weight of authority is that the infant is not estopped to
repudiate his contract.l"
The courts in barring recovery to the infant for misrep-
resentation and fraud in equity recognize the rule that an
infant is not estopped either in law or in equity since deceit
cannot give validity to a contract which has no validity, but
state there is an exception to the rule. What this excep-
tion is has not been clearly defined, yet the results are fairly
uniform in applying the alleged exception. In fact what the
courts are doing is simply denying equitable relief to an
infant in the particular case because due to the nature of
the deceit and fraud in that case to grant him relief would not
be equitable. It would be making the court a partner in the
injustice and would be abolishing the equitable doctrines
that he who seeks equity must do equity and he who seeks
equity must come into court with clean hands. In other
Watson v. Billings, 38 Ark. 278, 281 (1881); Lee v. Hibernia Savings &
Loan Society, 177 Cal. 656, 171 Pac. 677 (1918); Carolina Interstate Building &
Loan Assn. v. Black, 119 N. C. 323, 25 S. E. 975 (1896); Sims v. Euerhardt,
102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87 (1880); MADDEN oN DomESTIC REr.ATIONS (1931),
p. 552, § 203. See Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 40 (1853); Con-
rad v. Lane, 26 Minn. 389, 4 N. W. 695 (1880); Collins Inv. Co. v. Beard, 46
Okla. 310, 148 Pac. 846 (1915).
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words, an infant is not estopped by misrepresentation of
age since estoppel in pais does not apply to infants, but
equity jurisdiction, and rules of equity are not limited to
adults. They are applicable to all.
Thus, for example, though Illinois does not recognize that
an infant is estopped either in law or in equity to disaffirm
his contracts because of a misrepresentation of age or other
such deceit, yet in the case of Lewis v. Van Cleve U1 the court
denied the quondam infant relief on the alleged ground of
estoppel. In that case the minor's mother conveyed her
property to him, without consideration, to defraud her credi-
tors. A few months later the minor, seventeen or eighteen
years of age, reconveyed to his mother, and sometime after-
ward assisted her in selling it. He told the agent who had
charge of the sale that when he sold it to his mother that he
was of age. The minor received considerable from the
proceeds of the sale by the mother. The quondam minor
sought to repudiate his deed and assert title as against sub-
sequent purchasers and mortgagees who acted in good faith.
In denying relief some of the statements of the court are
as follows: " 'Estoppel will not ordinarily be based on the
acts and declarations of infants, but cases may arise in
which, for the prevention of fraud or unfairness, a court of
equity may decree such an estoppel.'" "Cases recognizing
an exception... (are) in case the conduct of the infant...
has been intentional and fraudulent and the infant was at
the time of years of discretion." "'Such estoppels are, and
should be, favored in law, honor and conscience, for the
truest and best of reasons . . .' " " 'This principle, so equi-
table and legal, runs throughout all the transactions and con-
tracts of civilized life.'" " 'He has no more right to com-
mit a fraud than an adult.' "'This principle of equitable
estoppels of this character applies to infants, as well as
adults . . .' "
56 Op. cit. supra note 54.
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The court had before it the case of Wieland v. Kobick"
where the plaintiff, a girl seventeen years of age, had con-
veyed land, had misrepresented her age, received the money
and spent it, and then sought to disaffirm. In her ejectment
suit the court held she was not estopped to disaffirm the deed.
In both cases the age at the time of conveyance was about
the same, and in both a misrepresentation of age. The
Wieland case was a law case in ejectment, and the Lewis
case, one in equity which might seem to sustain that an in-
fant is estopped in equity, but not in law for a misrepre-
sentation of age. However, law or equity case had little to
do with it. The court in the Wieland ejectment suit simply
applied the rule that a minor may disaffirm an executed con-
tract and is not estopped by a misrepresentation of age
since estoppel in pais does not apply to infants. The court
found no injustice or such fraud that called for the applica-
tion of a third rule that he who seeks equity must come into
court with clean hands. A girl seventeen, without intent to
defraud, sold her land, misstated her age to do so, and later
on decided to disaffirm. The law aims to protect minors
against their own improvidence, hence in this case the court
saw in the application of the usual legal rule no injustice,
though in fact it did cause injury.
In the Lewis case, however, the minor was a boy of con-
siderable discretion, though only seventeen or eighteen at
time of first conveyance. He gave active assistance there-
after, both before and after age, in carrying out what he
knew to be a fraudulent transaction throughout. His moth-
er conveyed to him, without consideration, to defraud. He
profited by the transaction in which formerly he had no
claim. The court recognized the legal rules, but found an
exception. The court really found it necessary to apply a
third rule, that he who seeks equity must come into court
with clean hands. There was no desire on the part of the
57 110 IM. 16, 51 Am. Rep. 676 (1884).
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court to make itself a party to the fraud by granting the
quondam minor the relief he sought. There is no denial
of the rules regarding minors in this case, and really no ex-
ception to them. The rules of law allowing disaffirmance
or denying estoppel of infants do not destroy all other rules
when applicable. It seems to me that to allow an infant to
take advantage of an actual fraud on the ground that an
infant can disaffirm a contract and is not subject to estoppel
in pais because of a misrepresentation of age, is like dis-
missing a speeder for violating a valid city ordinance limit-
ing the speed to twenty miles per hour, because the state
law says you can drive up to forty miles per hour. A rule
of law on a given situation does not destroy the other rules
when applicable any more than the law which makes killing
a human being while engaged in a robbery, murder, demands
a dismissal for robbery if the victim is not killed.
The federal courts 58 recognize this principle by tenta-
tively conceding that estoppel does not apply to infants, and
place their decisions denying relief squarely on rules of
equity which apply to both infants and adults.
The courts are not enforcing the contract, but enforcing
equity. At times, incidentally, the result is the same.
IN TORT FOR DECEIT
In the "hypothetical case" there was a misrepresentation
of age which gives rise to another problem and that is, can
the infant be held liable in a tort action for deceit? Since
an infant is liable for his torts not arising out of contract,
can the adult by charging deceit recoup his loss caused there-
by without resorting to the contract?
All of the elemefnts of a tort action for deceit are present
in many cases where the infant misrepresents his age, that
is, there is a false representation of a material existing fact
58 Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., op. cit. supra note 26; Carmen v. Fox Film
Corp., 269 Fed. 928, 15 A. L. R. 1209 (1920).
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with intent to deceive and to induce a person to act, and that
person relying on the representation is thereby induced to
act and to his injury. If then there is as in the "hypothe-
tical case" an actual deceit, should not the action lie for the
actual damages caused to the adult?
The objection raised is that an infant is not liable on his
contracts, nor for his torts arising out of contract, since to
enforce the tort liability would indirectly be enforcing the
contract and would be depriving the infant of the protection
of the laws so meant for him. To this statement there is
no objection, but the question remains, is the misrepresenta-
tion of age a tort arising out of contract, or is it independ-
ent of it.
The great weight of authority is that it is a tort independ-
ent of the contract."  England,6" Massachusetts,6 Mary-
land,6 2 and North Carolina 63 are to the contrary.
There is no contract about the age of the infant when, for
example, he buys an automobile. It is a contract concern-
ing the motor vehicle as to its identity, description, price,
mode of payment, and the like. The age stated is incidental
to the contract and is material only because of the purely
collateral matter that an infant is not bound if he is not of
age, the adult seeking to determine if he shall contract.
In many cases the question of age is antecedent to the
contract, a preliminary precaution, and not part of the con-
59 Continental Guaranty Corp. of Canada v. Mark, 4 D. L. R. 707 (Can.
1926), 27 CoL. LAW REV. 466; Davidson v. Young, 38 Ill. 145 (1865); Rice v.
Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 58 Am. Rep. 53, 9 N. E. 420 (1886); Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H.
441 (1838); Wisconsin Loan & Finance Co. v. Goodnough, 201 Wis. 101, 228
N. W. 484, 67 A. L. R. 1259 (1930); Chasser v. Hutton, 139 Misc. Rep. 623,
248 N. Y. S. 136 (1931). See note to Lowry v. Cate, 57 L. R. A. 673 (Tenn.
1901).
60 Johnson v. Pie, 1 Lev. 169, 1 Keble 905 (1666) ; Price v. Hewitt, 8 Exch.
146, 155 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1852).
(a- Slayton v. Barry, 175 Mass. 513, 49 L. R. A. 560, 78 A. S. R. 510, 56
N. E. 574 (1900).
62 Monumental Bldg. Assn. v. Herman, 33 Md. 128 (1870).
63 Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, op. cit. supra note 9.
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tract at all. Here quite clearly it seems to be a tort in-
dependent of the contract. However, even if it were stated
in the contract as part of it, it is still only incidental. A
similar case would arise where an infant agrees in a con-
tract not to wilfully injure the property he receives. The
infant is liable for wilful injury and I think it would not be
seriously contended that the infant is not liable for his tort
in wilfully injuring the property because that is part of the
contract, whereas if that had been left out he would be
liable. He is liable in such a case, contract or no contract.
Whether it is a tort independent of contract as is conceded,
or simply the law desires to create that iesponsibility, need
not be determined, but it seems to me that a misrepresenta-
tion of age, even if in the contract, and a wilful injury,
even if the subject of specific agreement are both incidental
to the contract and are torts independent thereof within the
contemplation of the principles of the law making minors
"liable for their torts, excepting those arising out of con-
tract."
It is conceded that if an infant who hires a horse, or an
automobile, wilfully injures or destroys the bailed property,
he is responsible for the damage, or is liable in an action
of trover for conversion; yet surely the wilful injury of an
article obtained by an infant by contract is as closely con-
nected with the contract and rises therefrom as much as a
wilful misstatement of age to get possession of such property.
It is not contended that the deceit makes the infant re-
sponsible for his contract any more than that wilful injury
makes the infant so liable. It is, however, submitted that
such tortious conduct entails liability, or should do so, in an
action of tort for deceit, if it causes damage to an innocent
party, and to the extent of the damage only, no more, no
less, regardless of the contract.
It has been advanced that to hold an infant in tort would
make it a simple matter for anyone with such intent to hold
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all infants by getting them to misstate their ages. It must
be kept in mind that an action of deceit requires more than
proof of misrepresentation. In addition to other things,
the statement must be the inducement to contract, must be
relied on, and must cause injury. Quite uniformly the cases
hold that the fraud must be actual, not constructive only,
that is, mere failure to disclose age is not enough.64 It is
also obvious that a boy fifteen or sixteen years of age could
not represent himself to be twenty-one so as to induce a
reliance on that representation. The same would be true
of anyone not appearing of age. Also, if the adult would
have sold to the infant, whether of age or not, it could not
be said he was induced to act by the false representation.
The burden of proving all the elements of the deceit would
be on the adult and in addition the contract must be a fair
one with no overstepping. Even where fair, the adult's
recovery would be the actual damage of the deceit and not
the contract price.
In Johnson v. Pie,65 the leading case holding that deceit
will not lie against an infant for misrepresentation in induc-
ing a contract, the court says that if infants were bound by
their deceits all the infants in England would be ruined.
The courts have, in many cases other than when dealing with
infants, refused a recovery on grounds of policy in that to
hold otherwise would let loose a flood of litigation, yet when
some state passed a law allowing recovery in the identical
situation no such dire results followed.66 The same has
been found true with infants in deceit cases.
64 Wisconsin Loan & Finance Co. v. Goodnough, op. cit. supra note 59;
Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, op. cit. supra note 59; Corey v. Michael-
ovitch, 46 R. I. 3S7, 128 Atl. 673, 39 A. L. R. 374 (1925). See Young v. Daniel,
201 Ky. 65, 255 S. W. 854 (1923); First State Bank v. Edwards, 245 S. W. 478
(Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
65 Op. cit. supra note 60.
66 For examples, see dissenting opinion of Justice Crownhart in Wick v
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, 52 A. L. R. 1113 (1927).
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As a further answer to the English court, it might be said
that it is doubtful if all infants are liars in such cases. Be-
sides the same court would hold the infant liable for trover,
slander, trespass, and for wilful injuries. In doing so they
would find no serious evil results; why here? It also might
be suggested that a little responsibility for intentional wrong-
doing would not be remiss for a twenty-year-old infant when
the only result would be to require payment of actual dam-
ages for his deceit in an otherwise fair and reasonable con-
tract.
In England the consequence of not holding the infant for
deceit is counteracted by a far more liberal appliance of
equitable doctrines.
One of the more recent cases upholding the minority view
is Greensboro Morris Plan Company v. Palmer 17 which
stressed the fact that the age was in the contract as part of
it and not antecedent to it as in Fitts v. Hall,6" which held
contra. It has already been suggested that this point should
not be controlling.
In Vermont Acceptance Corporation v. Wiltshire 69 the
defendant, an infant nineteen years of age, purchased a car
from the motor company on a conditional bill of sale agree-
ment giving a note for the balance due. The conditional
sales agreement contained a stipulation that the car should
not be used in connection with any violation of state or fed-
eral law. The defendant infant was arrested for transport-
ing intoxicating liquor in the automobile and it was seized.
The plaintiff, the assignee of defendant's note, contended
that the defendant's wilful use of the car for transporting
intoxicating liquor in violation of the federal law, and of his
agreement, was a conversion for which he is liable in tort.
The court upheld the plaintiff's contention ruling that the
67 Op. cit. supra note 63.
68 Op. cit. supra note 59.
69 153 At]. 199, 73 A. L. R. 792 (Vt. 1931).
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quondam infant was liable in conversion for such an in-
tentional and wilful use of the property contrary to the con-
sent of the creditor, and in violation of the agreement result-
ing in its loss.
It is difficult to see where the above tort for conversion
is any more independent of the contract than the age repre-
sentation in making a contract to purchase the same car.
In fact this seems much more a part of and dependent on
the contract than the infant's age.
In Wisconsin Loan & Finance Corporation v. Good-
nough o the defendant, a minor nineteen years ten months
old, and mother, were co-partners in a confectionary store.
To enlarge the business they borrowed money to purchase
equipment for a lunch counter. They signed a judgment
note to the plaintiff for $400.00, carrying 10 per cent inter-
est, and for reasonable attorney's fees. The defendant mis-
represented his age to induce the contract. At the time
of the suit $25.00 had been paid on the note. A jury
found $370.42 was still unpaid and $30.00 a reasonable
amount for attorney's fees. The actual sum received on
the note was $352.00. The upper court in reversing the
case set aside the judgment on the note and refused to recog-
nize an estoppel against the infant because of the misrepre-
sentation of age, but did enter judgment against him for
$352.00 plus interest less the $25.00 repaid. This the court
allowed as actual damage caused by the deceit. The court
after holding that a misrepresentation of age is a tort not
arising out of contract said:
"It is a matter of some importance, however, to determine whether
an infant who secures benefits by misrepresenting his age to the
person from whom he secures them is estopped to set up his infancy
in order to defeat the contract, or whether he becomes liable in an
action for deceit for damages. In this case, if there is an estoppel
which operates to prevent the defendant from repudiating the con-
70 Op. cit. supra note 59.
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tract and he is liable upon it, the damages will -be the full amount of
the note plus interest and a reasonable attorney's fee. If he is held
liable, on the other hand, in deceit, he will be liable only for the
damages which the plaintiff sustained in this case, the amount -of
money the plaintiff parted with, which was $352 less the $25 repaid.
There -seems to be sound reason in the position of the English.courts
that to hold the contract enforceable by way of estoppel is to go
contrary to the clearly declared policy of the law. But, as was pointed
out by the New Hampshire court,7 1 that objection lies no more for
wrongs done by a minor by way of deceit than by way of slander
or other torts. The contract is not enforced. He is held liable for
deceit'as he is for other torts such as slander, trover, and trespass."
There is a dictum in Keal v. Rhydderck 72 which, in recog-
nizing estoppel of minors in certain exceptions only and
recognizing his liability in tort for deceit, indicates that the
estoppel is to prevent a circuity of action. The estoppel un-
der such a condition would be really holding liability in tort,
but enforcing it in the suit before the court to avoid allow-
ing a recovery to the minor and then nullifying it later by
allowing the adult recovery in a tort action for deceit. This
dictum is supported by decisions in other states.7"
SUMMARY OF LAw
(1) A minor may rescind his executed or unexecuted
contracts for the purchase of personal property, and on of-
fering the return of the property received in its existing
condition, if still in his control, or nothing if not, may in
the majority of American jurisdictions recover whatever
money or property he has parted with without deduction
for depreciation, use, or benefits. This rule is followed in
Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, and Ver-
mont. This view is sometimes spoken of as the Massachu-
setts or majority rule.
71 Fitts v. Hall, op. cit. supra note 59.
72 317 IH. 231, at 239, 148 N. E. 53 (1925).
73 Chasser v. Hutton, op. cit. supra note 59.
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(2) The New York, or minority rule, is that a minor
may repudiate as in (1) above but in the recovery must al-
low, by way of deduction, the amount of depreciation and
use of the article, if a fair contract. If the depreciation is
more than the amount paid in, the minor can recover noth-
ing, but in no case can the adult recover more than the
amount already received. This rule is followed in Alabama,
Connecticut, Canada, District of Columbia, England, Fed-
eral Courts, New York, Ohio, and Oregon. Connecticut al-
lows depreciation, but not use.
(3) The third, or provident rule allows repudiation as
in (1) and (2) above, but if the contract is a fair, reason-
able, and provident one, he must allow in his recovery a
deduction for the benefits or profits actually received from
the contract. Under this rule benefits ordinarily arise only
in case of business contracts, hence full recovery is usually
allowed. This rule is followed in Minnesota and New
Hampshire.
(4) Some few states hold the minor to his contract, if
fair, on the grounds of estoppel where he has misrepresented
his age. If, however, there has been no such misrepresenta-
tion then the Massachusetts, New York, or provident rule
applies depending on the jurisdiction. This rule is followed
in Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Texas.
This is also the rule by statute in Kansas, Iowa, Utah, and
Washington.
(5) In an equitable proceeding the great weight of au-
thority is also that a minor in seeking relief is not estopped
by a misrepresentation of age, or other deceit, in inducing the
contract. However, the weight of authority is that an in-
fant is estopped'where he is seeking to take advantage of
his fraud to obtain positive relief or gain which would be
fraudulent and unjust. This is often called an exception
to the rule that infants are never estopped in pais, but usual-
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ly the case is one where the equitable principles of he who
seeks equity must do equity or else he who seeks equity
must come into court with clean hands are applicable.
Stated in another way, equity has jurisdiction to apply its
rules to infants as well as to adults.
(6) Some states by statute permit a minor to rescind his
contracts, but if eighteen years of age or over when con-
tracting, he must restore the adult to status quo where the.
contract is a fair and reasonable one. Statutes of this na-
ture may be found in California, Idaho, and North Dakota.
(7) A minor who has knowingly misrepresented his age
to induce a contract and his statement is relied on and does
induce the contract to the adult's injury, the adult may
hold the minor liable for actual damages caused thereby in
an action of tort for deceit. The great weight of authority
is that this is a tort not arising out of contract, but independ-
ent thereof. England, Massachusetts, Maryland, and North
Carolina hold contra on the principle that it is a tort arising
out of contract and an indirect enforcement of the contract.
(8) A dictum in an Illinois case suggests that if for any
reason such as deceit, estoppel, or equitable rule, cross rights
are recognized between the adult and the infant, it should
be all settled in one suit, presumably equity, to avoid a cir-
cuity of action.
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